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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this appeal is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e), as an appeal from a court of record not involving a first 
degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions which lacked a mens 
rea instruction, operate to deny Appellant effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution? 
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah 
1989). 
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at 
trial, appellate review is still possible when an error should have been 
obvious to the trial court and is sufficiently harmful to require reversal. 
II. Did trial counsel's failure to object to the questions directed to Airman Lyon 
asking if Geukgeuzian knew that Lyon heard him make threats against his 
estranged wife, operate to deny Geukgeuzian effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution? 
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah 
1989). 
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where objections to testimony were not 
made at trial, appellate review is still possible when an error should 
have been obvious to the trial court and is sufficiently harmful to 
require reversal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The following statute is determinative of the issues or portion thereof addressed in 
the respective briefs of the parties. The text of the statute is presented in its entirety in 
the Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On February 7, 2001, Defendant/Appellant Stephen L. Geukgeuzian 
(Geukgeuzian) was convicted of tampering with a witness and making a written false 
statement. Geukgeuzian appealed the convictions citing manifest injustice and 
ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court upheld Geukgeuzian's conviction for 
written false statements and reversed the witness tampering conviction; holding the trial 
court's failure to include a mens rea element in its jury instructions resulted in manifest 
injustice. Due to this Court's reversal on the manifest injustice claim, Geukgeuzian's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the witness tampering charge was not 
addressed. The State appealed and the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari. The 
Supreme Court concluded the errors in the jury instructions were invited by Geukgeuzian 
and reversed the decision of this Court. Acknowledging the unresolved issues 
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concerning trial counsel's performance, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to 
this Court for further consideration as to whether Geukgeuzian received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. In May of 2000, Geukgeuzian, at the urging of his attorney, approached 
several co-workers at Hill Air Force Base, and requested that they write a statement on 
Geukgeuzian's behalf in conjunction with an ex-parte protective order filed by 
Geukgeuzian's estranged wife. One such co-worker was Airman Jason Lyon ("Lyon"). 
(Appellate Record, hereinafter R., 00141: 99, 120-121.) 
2. Geukgeuzian asked Lyon to include in his statement whether Geukgeuzian 
had made threats against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 120-125.) 
3. Unbeknownst to Geukgeuzian, Lyon had, approximately one week before, 
provided a written statement to the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") of Hill Air 
Force Base wherein he stated, among other things, that he had overheard Geukgeuzian 
make threats or speak threateningly against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 25-29.) 
4. Lyon testified that at no time did Geukgeuzian make any verbal or physical 
threats towards him nor did Geukgeuzian promise Lyon anything to induce him to write 
the statement. (R. 00141: 56.) 
5. Lyon agreed to write a statement on behalf of Geukgeuzian without voicing 
any objection whatsoever. Subsequently, Lyon wrote a statement while he was alone at 
his dormitory. He later gave the statement to Geukgeuzian. (R. 00141: 33-34.) 
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6. Lyon at no time told Geukgeuzian (1) about the OSI investigation; (2) that 
Lyon had previously provided a written statement to OSI; (3) that the statement which he 
had given to OSI was contrary to the statement he had given to Geukgeuzian; or (4) that 
Lyon did not believe what he had written. (R. 00141: 123-25.) 
7. Lyon did not inform his superior officers or any member of OSI that 
Geukgeuzian had asked for, and that he had provided him, a written statement. (R. 
00141:42-43,46.) 
8. Geukgeuzian provided Lyon's written statement to his attorney Pete Vlahos 
who subsequently submitted the same to the Second District Court in a protective order 
hearing. (R. 00141: 100.) 
9. Lyon pleaded guilty to giving a false written statement, a Class B 
Misdemeanor in exchange for his agreement to testify against Geukgeuzian. (R. 00141: 
51-52.) 
10. Defense counsel at trial, Richard J. Culbertson, failed to object to a line of 
questioning between the State's attorney and Lyon wherein Lyon testified as to the 
personal knowledge and state of mind of defendant. (R. 00141: 31.) 
11. Culbertson passed, without objection, the jury instructions, which were 
ultimately given to the jury. (R. 00141: 135-142.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Geukgeuzian was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution when trial counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
a. Trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions that were 
obviously flawed in regard to critical elements of the crimes charged constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
b. Trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's line of questioning to 
Airman Lyon regarding Geukgeuzian's knowledge constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A 
RESULT GEUKGEUZIAN WAS DEPRIVED OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Trial counsel's performance clearly fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness in two areas. First, trial counsel did not object to the jury instructions, 
which failed to adequately instruct the jury as to the appropriate mens rea. Second, trial 
counsel did not object to testimony solicited by the State and offered by Airman Lyon as 
to Geukgeuzian's state of mind. Such errors prejudiced Geukgeuzian and deprived him 
of a fair trial. The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part test to 
determine whether a defendant was deprived of his Constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
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First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This test for determining the 
adequacy of trial counsel has been embraced and applied by Utah courts. See e.g., State 
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Despite the presumption of competence as 
expressed in Strickland and its progeny, Utah courts have continually noted that appellate 
courts "must review each case carefully to prevent the infrequent meritorious claim from 
being reflexively swept into the tide of affirmance by the chronicles of probability." 
State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Rather, the appellate court 
must not "mechanically apply the two-part standard . . . but instead . . . 'focus upon the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged. The purpose of the inquiry is simply 
to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
"The prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is equivalent to the 
harmfulness test applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778, 780 (Utah 
2000). To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
(i) identify specific acts or omissions that fall below the standard of 
reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the 
act or omission and under all attendant circumstances, and (ii) 
demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but 
for the error, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would 
have been more favorable to the defendant. 
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Id. at 781-82 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993)). When viewed in 
this light, the record shows that the performance of Geukgeuzian's trial counsel not only 
falls below an objective level of reasonableness, but also that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result of the trial would have been different but for the ineffective 
assistance. 
a. Trial Counsel's Performance in Failing to Object to the Jury 
Instructions as Presented by the Trial Court Was Legally Deficient. 
Under Utah Law, "a defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . . the words 'element of the offense' mean: (a) the conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited or forbidden in the definition 
of the offense; (b) the culpable mental state required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 
(1973) (emphasis added). See also, American Fork v. Carr, 970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). ("When instructing the jury on the elements of the offense, the trial court 
must specifically instruct the jury regarding the 'culpable mental state required' to 
commit the offense."). Further, "[e]very offense not involving strict liability shall require 
a culpable mental state, and when the offense does not specify a culpable mental state . . . 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-102(1983). 
The instructions submitted to the jury were prejudicially inadequate. Geukgeuzian 
was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (witness tampering); an 
examination of this statute in conjunction with the jury instructions demonstrates how the 
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instructions failed to adequately charge the jury regarding the requisite mental state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 states in pertinent part, "a person is guilty of a third degree 
felony if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or inform 
falsely; (b) withhold any testimony, information, document or item . . . " Id. 
According to Instruction No. 29 of the instructions submitted to the jury by the 
trial court1, in order to find Geukgeuzian guilty of the crime of tampering with a witness, 
the jury must find all of the following elements, "1 . That on or about May 15, 2000, in 
Davis County, State of Utah: 2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, believing 
an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted; 3. Attempted 
to induce or other [sic] cause a person to: a. Testify or inform falsely; or b. Withhold any 
testimony, information, document, or item." While the language of the instruction tracks 
the language of the statute, there is no explanation regarding the culpable mental state 
required for a conviction in this or any other instruction submitted. 
In making a determination of guilt regarding tampering with a witness, there are in 
reality two mental states that must be evaluated. The first is whether the person charged, 
"believ[ed] that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1). The law with regard to the requisite mental state 
attached to this portion of the statute is clear, "the statute requires no more than a 
defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation to be underway." State v. 
1
 A true and correct copy of the jury instructions has been provided in the Addendum. 
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Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985). Geukgeuzian did not then, nor does he now 
contend that he did not believe an official proceeding or investigation to be underway. 
The second mental state relates to the acts or conduct prescribed by the statute. 
The witness tampering statute, however, does not delineate what mental state is required. 
Where a statute does not specifically identify a culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-102 (1983). Thus, there must be some level of knowledge, intent2, or recklessness 
attached to Geukgeuzian's request for Lyon to provide a statement. 
In determining which of these mental states apply to the witness tampering statute, 
Utah courts have established that, to be convicted of tampering with a witness, a 
defendant must "knowingly and intentionally [attempt] to induce or otherwise cause 
another person to [testify or inform falsely; or] withhold any testimony, information, 
document, or thing." State v. Tolman, 115 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis 
added). See also Sate v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) (noting that to be found 
guilty of witness tampering defendant would have to know her daughter would be a 
witness in a subsequent proceeding; and that she told her daughter not to testify). 
Further instruction as to the proper mental state to apply in this regard can be 
gleaned from the Legislature's use of the word attempt as an element in the witness 
tampering statute. Like any attempted crime, the requisite mental state to be applied with 
regard to witness tampering should be the same—namely, a specific intent to induce the 
2
 Although Instruction No. 34 does define "intentionally," it is of little or no use to the 
jury as it is not clear to which charge or portion thereof this definition applies. 
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identified acts. See e.g., State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 1992) (noting historical 
position of the Court that an attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to 
commit that crime). Thus, to be found guilty of attempting to induce the acts identified in 
the statute, Geukgeuzian must logically have intended to induce a person to testify falsely 
or withhold any testimony, information, document, or item to meet the elements of 
attempting to induce these acts. 
In the present case, there is no language in Instruction No. 29, or any other jury 
instruction, delineating what mental state the defendant must possess to support a 
conviction of attempting to induce or cause a person to inform falsely. Instruction No. 29 
merely states in pertinent part, "attempted to induce or other cause a person to: a. Testify 
or inform falsely; or b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item." 
Accordingly the jury was not informed that in order to convict Geukgeuzian the jury 
would have to find that he possessed a specific mental state. The jury was not informed 
that mental state is an essential element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even had the jury somehow divined the necessity of finding that Geukgeuzian possessed 
a specific mental state, it had no instruction about which mental state to require. Because 
Geukgeuzian was tried for both witness tampering and providing a false written statement 
the confusion concerning which mental state might apply to which offense increases 
exponentially. In the end, members of the jury were left without guidance as to the 
appropriate mens rea, and were free to apply whatever standard of mental culpability they 
wished, from strict liability to criminal negligence. 
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Accordingly trial counsel's performance was prejudicially deficient and satisfies 
the first prong of the Strickland test. Trial counsel should have been alert and aware of 
these deficiencies. Trial counsel had access to these instructions for review before they 
were submitted to the jury. Likewise, trial counsel was present in court as the 
instructions were read aloud to the jury. Yet at no time did trial counsel object to the lack 
of mens rea instructions, which constitutes an essential element of the crimes charged for 
which the prosecution bore the full burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Is there a rational explanation or tactical reason for trial counsel' s failure to object 
to the omissions in the Instructions? Defending claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel often devolves into an appellate parlor game of concocting obscure and 
labyrinthian after-the-fact tactical explanations for constitutionally deficient performance 
of trial counsel. In the present case trial counsel's mind was devoid of any strategic or 
tactical reason for failing to properly instruct the jury. In its review of Geukgeuzian's 
case the Utah Supreme Court concluded that, "Geukgeuzian's [trial counsel's] failure to 
include a separate mens rea element in his proposed instruction was most likely 
inadvertent..." State v. Geukgeuzian, 86 P.3d 742, 745 (Utah 2004)(emphasis added). 
Where no possible explanation or tactical reason exists for such a decision, Utah courts 
have held that the first part of the Stricklandtest has been met. See e.g., State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 1999). 
b. Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance Prejudiced Geukgeuzian and 
Deprived Him the Opportunity of a Fair Trial 
l l 
The court must then look to the second prong of the Strickland tost, prejudice to 
Geukgeuzian. Appropriate and complete the jury instructions would have provided the 
jury with the proper mens rea requirements and would have allowed the jury to consider 
the proper elements of the crime charged. As a result of trial counsel's errors, however, 
jurors were free to insert whatever standard of culpability they wished, rather than 
applying the proper standard as required by law. Accordingly, it is impossible to 
determine on the basis of the record whether the jury applied the evidence to each 
element that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Where 
this Court cannot determine from the record whether the proper elements were 
considered, there is a reasonable probability of a different result. See State v. Callahan, 
866 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243, 
1249 (Utah 2000) (failure to object to jury instructions which identified incorrect 
elements of crime sufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland). 
The gravamen of the error of failing to include a mental state element instruction 
is addressed in the case law surrounding the doctrine of manifest injustice3. While Rule 
19(c) of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure generally prohibits appellate review of jury 
instructions that were not adjudicated at trial, an exception is noted for cases involving 
manifest injustice. Manifest injustice has been defined as errors, which are so 
fundamental as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Utah courts have continually held 
3
 The reference to manifest injustice is not an attempt to reargue or dispute the decision of 
the Supreme Court, which reversed this Court's prior ruling based on the doctrine of 
invited error; rather the reference is illustrative of the seriousness of the prejudice which 
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that a failure to give an elements instruction for a crime constitutes manifest injustice and 
reversible error as a matter of law. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App 
1995)(quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)). 
When the same failure to instruct the jury on the requisite mental state element of 
the crime charged is evaluated for prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test 
the same conclusion should result. Failure to instruct on mental state is such a 
fundamental flaw that as a matter of law, it is sufficiently prejudicial to satisfy the second 
prong. By its nature, failure to instruct a jury on the essential element of the mental state 
applicable to the crime charged deprived Geukgeuzian of a fair trial. 
e. Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Line of Questioning 
to Airman Lyon Regarding Geukgeuzian's Knowledge Constituted 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
During the Prosecutor's direct questioning of Airman Lyon, the prosecutor asked 
Airman Lyon, "Going back to when you heard the threats and the things that you made 
statements about, was Steven aware that you were around when you made those 
statements?" (R. 00141: 31, lines 18-20.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." 
(R. 00141: 31, line 21.) The Prosecutor followed, "and so he would, and so he, when he 
asked you, as far as you're concerned when he asked you to write this statement he was 
asking you to write something that he knew was false." (R. 00141: 31, lines 22-24.) 
(emphasis added.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." (R. 00141: 31, line 25.) 
At no time during this exchange did trial counsel object to the line of questioning, either 
Utah courts have accorded to deficient instructions on the requisite mental state element 
of a crime. 
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on grounds of foundation, leading question or speculation. As a result, the jury was 
allowed to hear, and consider without a curative instruction, a statement attributing a state 
of mind to the defendant, which was supported by no other evidence before the court. 
Utah R. Evid. 602 states "a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter." Id. No evidence was introduced to support a contention to the effect that 
Airman Lyon had any personal knowledge whatsoever regarding whether Appellant was 
aware Airman Lyon was present when Appellant allegedly made threatening statements 
about his wife. Nor was there any evidence introduced to establish the personal 
knowledge of Airman Lyon that Appellant was asking him to "write something that he 
knew was false." The fact that trial counsel failed to object to such a clear violation of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. 
See e.g., Callahan, 866 P.2d at 595 (failure of counsel to object to prosecutor's 
questioning in trial likely fails to meet the standard of reasonable representation). 
d. Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance in Failing to Object to 
Questioning Prejudiced Geukgeuzian and Deprived Him of a Fair 
Trial 
When viewed in light of all attendant circumstances, trial counsel's failure to 
object to this line of questioning clearly resulted in significant prejudice to Appellant. 
Throughout this brief, Appellant has maintained and established that the failure to 
instruct the jury as to the elements of the crimes charged resulted in prejudice to the 
Appellant. While the failure to object to a line of questioning may be sustained under 
other circumstances as a "reasonable trial strategy", under the attendant circumstances in 
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this matter, trial counsel's error clearly affected the ability of the jury to reach a 
trustworthy verdict. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. 
The key issue at trial was whether Appellant knowingly induced a person to testify 
or inform falsely under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508. By failing to object to the identified 
line of questioning, the danger of the jury misapplying the facts to the unidentified mental 
state elements of the crime charged was exacerbated to an unacceptable level. Had trial 
counsel objected to this line of questioning, it is unlikely that the jury would have reached 
a verdict based on Airman Lyon's testimony that he never told Geukgeuzian that the 
statement was untrue and Geukgeuzian's testimony the he never asked Lyon to do or say 
anything which Appellant believed to be untrue. By failing to object to a line of 
questioning where the witness was invited to speculate as to Geukgeuzian's knowledge at 
the time the writings were made, trial counsel created a situation where the jury verdict is 
suspect and, but for these errors, the outcome of the trial would likely be different. 
As a result of trial counsel's clear failure to provide effective assistance and the 
prejudice suffered by Geukgeuzian as a result, Geukgeuzian is entitled to a reversal of his 
witness tampering conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
witness tampering conviction of the lower court and remand for a new trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/&_ day of September 2004. 
;>^sS 
Kendall S. Peterson 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _[±_ day of September 2004,1 caused to be 
delivered by regular first class mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Westiaw. 
UT ST § 76-8-508 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-508 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentnoss 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*il Chapter £. Offenses Against The Administration of Government 
*ii Parr 5. Falsification in Official Matters 
••§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness—Receiving or soliciting a 
bribe 
(1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with a 
witness if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, or with the intent to prevent an 
official proceeding or investigation, he attempts to induce or 
otherwise cause another person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he 
has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or 
receiving a bribe as a witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to 
accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts 
specified under Subsection (1). 
(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving 
a bribe under this section does not merge with any other substantive 
offense committed in the course of committing any offense under this 
section. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-508; Laws 1988, c. 175, § 1; Laws 2000, 
c. 1, § 115, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 140, § 3, eff. May 3, 
2004. 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
ADDENDUM B 
CQURTORIiGuNijL :quRT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY- J 
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN LAMAR GEUKGEUZIAN, 
Defendant. 
i • • - • 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 001700592 
Judge: MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one through 
twenty-seven, given to you at the beginning of the trial. Additional instructions numbered 28 
through V / will be included at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these 
instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be 
carefully followed. 
Dated this J- day of _ , 2000. 
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particular laws, rules or directives that apply to this case.]
 Jcnm lst 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you from time 
to time during the trial. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of these 
instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to you, please follow along on 
your copy. Keep in mind the following points: 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally important. Don't pick 
out one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others. 
Obey Instructions, You must obey the instructions. You are not allowed to reach decisions 
that go against the law. 
Gender - Singular-/Plural. In these instructions, the masculine gender such as "he" or 
"him"includes the feminine "she" or "her" and the singular such as "defendant" includes the 
plural "defendants" when appropriate. 
Note Taking. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it 
distract you from following the evidence. The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your 
memory is perfectly acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely excessively upon your 
notes. The lawyers will review important evidence in their closing arguments and help you 
focus on that which is most relevant to your decision. I also caution that notes are not 
evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or concentration. One juror's opinion 
should not be given excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case until you 
have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the instructions on 
the law. Keep an open mind until then. 
2. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, friends 
or even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so that 
people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the 
witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You may say "hello", or exchange similar 
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greetings or civilities with these persons, but don't engage in conversations. Don't accept from or 
give to any of these persons any favors, however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read 
about this case in the newspaper or listen to or watch any reports on television or radio. These 
constraints are necessary for a fair trial. 
3. THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important roles in 
the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct the 
jury on the LAW that it must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. Factual 
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things 
concerning which evidence will be presented. 
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to 
accept his version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of his client. 
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is your role. 
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based 
upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate what 
they think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the 
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and 
seeing the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will supplement 
these written instructions and review them with you. 
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Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will 
share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how 
they think you should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate 
until you reach a verdict. 
5. THE CHARGE and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The 
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be read or 
summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in mind that the 
defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The defendant is presumed to 
be innocent of the charge. 
[THE INFORMATION WILL NOW BE READ TO THE JURY] 
COUNT 1 
TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as follows: That on or about May 15, 2000, at the 
place aforesaid, the defendant believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, attempted to induce or otherwise cause a person to: testify or inform 
falsely; or withhold any testimony, information, document, item. 
COUNT 2 
WRITTEN FALSE STATMENT, as follows: That on or about May 18, 2000, at the place 
aforesaid, the defendant intending to deceive a public servant in the performance of his official 
function, made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did not believe to 
be true, knowingly created a false impression in a written application for a pecuniary or other 
benefit by omitting information necessary to prevent statements therein from being misleading or 
submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be lacking in authenticity, 
or upon a sample, map, boundary mark, or other object which he knew to be false. 
6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only on the 
evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess about 
any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions 
from the evidence presented. 
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7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It 
can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain qualified 
opinions, or any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree that certain 
facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having been proved. In limited 
instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this happens, I will explain how 
you should treat it. 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of law, upon either or both 
of which a jury may lawfully base its findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may 
carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of the testimony of 
every witness who, with any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part 
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence 
admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, 
statement or other conduct, or any circumstances of fact, tending to prove by reasonable 
inference the innocense or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a 
verdict. 
8. OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person who 
by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may 
give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) is also allowed to express an 
opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to understanding his testimony or 
the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other 
evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things which do not 
qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in reaching 
your verdict. 
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Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of 
committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is a competent witness in the 
defendant's own behalf, and the fact that the defendant is charged with the commission of 
a crime should not be regarded by you as tending to impeach or discredit the defendant's 
testimony. 
Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the range of 
potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment the defendant 
may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon the applicable law. 
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't consider 
that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused person has the right 
not to testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based upon the reliance on 
this right. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a 
preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their 
viewpoint. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You should 
not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections, 
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not produced in 
court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't look for information in 
law books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read about 
this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication. You 
must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the jury 
to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection 
is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it. If an objection is 
OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you 
should ignore it. 
[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL] Ojf&i) S ' / ' J 
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11. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should be 
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. 
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review all the 
evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence 
fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
12. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS 
As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may help 
you to ask yourself questions such as these: 
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way? 
Demeanor: What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while 
answering questions? 
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and 
the ability to remember them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe one 
witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
13. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to 
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that 
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what 
weight you think it deserves. 
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14. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The prosecution has the burden of proof It is the one making the accusations in this case. 
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. According to 
our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an innocent 
person being unjustly punished. 
15. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
16. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation, 
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person 
hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would be retained by 
reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must 
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
17. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you must 
determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the 
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not require that the evidence 
dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt. That is 
what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". 
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED] 
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18. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which 
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These 
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-eight (28). We will read those after 
completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to the procedure that 
you should follow. 
19. THE JUDGE IS IMPARTIAL 
The Constitution and the laws of this state absolutely prohibit the trial judge from making 
any comment about the witnesses or the evidence and I am not in any way permitted to assist you 
in determining what is or is not the truth in this case. 
Therefore, you are instructed that if during the trial I have said or done anything which 
has suggested to you that I am inclined to favor the claim or position of either party, you are not 
to permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. 
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are not, worthy 
of belief, nor which party should prevail. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an 
opinion relative to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the sole and 
only judges of the facts. 
20. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss 
this case: 
a. all exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. your notes (if any); 
c. your copy of these instructions; and 
d. the verdict form or forms. 
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21. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This 
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair." The Chair's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. To represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. to sign your verdict and bring it back in court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power 
than any other juror. 
22. CONSIDER EACH OTHER'S OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN 
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 
It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. 
When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate consideration of 
the case. Use your common memory, your common understanding and your common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. 
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with everyone else. 
However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are persuaded 
that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other than 
honest deliberation. 
23. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the 
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate. 
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based 
upon the evidence. 
24. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a 
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or 
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collective views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. Your verdict 
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will 
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a 
just and proper verdict. 
25. REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When 
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished. 
26. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict form which 
corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to court. 
27. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you about 
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave 
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings, 
which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not 
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to 
do that, please tell the Court Clerk. 
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INSTRUCTION NO 
These instructions contain the law that governs you in this case. In determining the facts, 
you may consider only the evidence given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me or 
ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you. 
Not one of these instructions states all of the law of this case, but all of them must be 
taken and considered together inasmuch as they are connected with and relate to each other. 
You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law. Regardless of your 
own opinion, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base you verdict upon any other view 
of the law than that given in my instructions. 
£. 
INSTRUCTION N O ^ A ^ 
Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH 
A WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 
2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted; 
3. Attempted to induce or other cause a person to: 
a. Testify or inform falsely; or 
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as 
charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J& 
Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of FALSE WRITTEN 
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information, you must find from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about May l£, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 
2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, intending to deceive a public servant 
in the performance of his official function; 
a. Made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did 
not believe to be true; or 
b. Submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be 
lacking in authenticity. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT, as 
charged in Count 2 of the Information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of FALSE WRITTEN 
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
No person shall be guilty of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, if he retracts the 
falsification before it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 2 
When it is charged that a crime was committed on or about a certain date, if the jury finds 
that the crime was committed by a defendant, the proof need not show that it was committed at 
the time so alleged, but may be proved to have been committed sometime on or about the date 
alleged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 
A Domestic Relations Commissioner and other court personnel at a hearing regarding an 
application for a protective order are public servants acting in their official function. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2£ 
A person engages in conduct: 
Intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
jr INSTRUCTION NO 
Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statement and circumstances. 
Me INSTRUCTION NO 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss or consider the subject of penalty 
or punishment, as that is a matter which lies with the court and other governmental agencies, and 
must not in any way affect your decision as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO n 
Your verdict in this case must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and returned by 
you into the court. Your verdict must be as follows: 
COUNT 1 
GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, 
OR 
NOT GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS 
COUNT2 
GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT 
OR 
NOT GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT. 
This being a criminal case, each and every juror is required to find a verdict of guilty. If 
Cannot 
there is not a unanimous verdict of 'guilty' by all jurors, then you Bana find the defendant' 
Wty'. Se<L XfVSsk i t^S" 
